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ABSTRACT
Image splicing is a very common image manipulation technique
that is sometimes used for malicious purposes. A splicing detec-
tion and localization algorithm usually takes an input image and
produces a binary decision indicating whether the input image
has been manipulated, and also a segmentation mask that corre-
sponds to the spliced region. Most existing splicing detection and
localization pipelines suer from two main shortcomings: 1) they
use handcraed features that are not robust against subsequent
processing (e.g., compression), and 2) each stage of the pipeline
is usually optimized independently. In this paper we extend the
formulation of the underlying splicing problem to consider two
input images, a query image and a potential donor image. Here
the task is to estimate the probability that the donor image has
been used to splice the query image, and obtain the splicing masks
for both the query and donor images. We introduce a novel deep
convolutional neural network architecture, called Deep Matching
and Validation Network (DMVN), which simultaneously localizes
and detects image splicing. e proposed approach does not depend
on handcraed features and uses raw input images to create deep
learned representations. Furthermore, the DMVN is end-to-end op-
timized to produce the probability estimates and the segmentation
masks. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that this approach
outperforms state-of-the-art splicing detection methods by a large
margin in terms of both AUC score and speed.
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1 MOTIVATION
e ubiquity of digital cameras and the rapid growth of social
networks have caused a proliferation of image and video content.
Image forgery is becoming a rampant problem, as a direct conse-
quence of digital content proliferation. Literally, the common idiom
seeing is believing does not hold true anymore, especially since
in recent years sophisticated image editing tools, such as Adobe
PhotoShop™ and GIMP have been pushing the limits of image com-
position in order to produce more natural and aesthetic images.
ese tools make it much easier to alter an image maliciously for a
non-professional user. Meanwhile, detecting and localizing image
forgeries, at a large scale, is becoming increasingly more dicult
for new processionals [41], forensic experts, and legal prosecutors.
ese new challenges necessitate developing novel and scalable
image forensics technologies.
Although image manipulation is sometimes used to indicate any
kind of technique that can be used to modify an image, it oen
means major manipulations from an image forensics perspective
[4, 31], such as splicing, copy-move, erasing, or retouching. Fig. 1
illustrates these common manipulations, where splicing denotes
copying one or more source image regions and pasting them onto
a destination image, while the other three types can be done using
a single source image. us, splicing is considered to be more
complicated since it involves external images.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 1: Image manipulation types. (a) and (b) original
missile and whale images; (c) spliced image by compositing
whale into missile; and (d)-(f) resulting images on missile
aer copy-move, erasing, and retouching, respectively.
Traditionally, copy-move and image splicing forgery detection
are oen thought of as two close problems [1, 4] that can be solved
within a general forgery detection framework (GFDF) [10–12], that
is: 1) representation, in which the characteristics of the underly-
ing image (pixel by pixel or holistically) are extracted as feature
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vectors; 2) matching, in which corresponding regions are deter-
mined from the feature representation; and 3) post-processing,
in which nearest-neighbor detection is linked and ltered to re-
duce false alarms and improve detection rates. It is worth noting
that many copy-move and image splicing detection algorithms rely
on strong or specic image hypothesis, e.g., photo-response non-
uniformity noise [8, 28], camera characteristics [21], color lter
array [35], JPEG compression [2, 6, 9, 26], edge sharpness [18, 30]
and local features [22, 23, 45]. Comprehensive reviews of these
approaches can be found in [4, 7, 19, 39]. e main assumption of
the approaches, in order to achieve high detection rates, is that one
or more of these clues must be present in a spliced image. However,
this assumption is not always valid since splicing manipulations
are usually followed by transformations (e.g., compression, resam-
pling or geometric transformations) that may hide traces of the
manipulation [4, 5].
In the recent Nimble 2017 Challenge from National Institute of
Standards and Technology,1 the image splicing problem has been
reformulated as: given a query imageQ and a potential donor image
P, the goal is to solve not only the detection problem, i.e., whether
or not Q contains spliced regions from P, but also the localization
problem, i.e., segmenting the spliced region(s) in both the donor and
the spliced images. Since this new problem formulation constrains
image splicing detection to a pair of images, we refer to it as the
constrained image splicing detection (CISD) problem. Fig. 2 shows
three input samples along with their ground truth splicing masks
and detection labels of CISD. is CISD problem can be viewed as
a new formulation of the classic copy-move detection problem in
the sense that it also looks for a potential region that is copy-move
from image P to image Q . Finally, this new CISD problem also plays
an important role in producing an image phylogeny graph [15–17]
for a query image given a big dataset, especially in explaining how
two images in neighboring nodes are associated.
Figure 2: Constrained image splicing detection problem,
where true spliced pixels are labeled as white. From top to
bottom, sample detection labels are 1, 1, and 0, respectively.
1hps://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/nimble-challenge-2017-evaluation
It is worth noting that the two-input nature of the new CISD
problem makes many existing image hypothesis used in classic
copy-move and splicing detection no longer applicable. For exam-
ple, [2] proposed an image splicing detection algorithm by dieren-
tiating single and double JPEG compression, but it is not useful for
the CISD problem because 1) we can neither guarantee that the two
inputs will be in JPEG format, nor that the inputs are compressed
with the same quantization table at the same level of quality; and 2)
even though both are of JPEG format and one region in P is detected
as doubly compressed, the CISD question “whether this region is
originally from Q” is still unanswered. As a result, the new CISD
denition urges the use of more robust assumptions and features.
Fortunately, visual clues, the visual correspondences between
splicing regions [3, 22, 24, 29, 37, 43, 45], are still useful in the new
CISD problem because they are probably the weakest assumptions
that we can make for that problem. is implies that we need two
things: 1) representations for visual clues, and 2) rules to determine
which two representations match. As one can see, these are exactly
the rst two steps (“representation” and “matching”) in the GFDF,
while the last step (“post-processing”) in the GFDF is really to take
advantage of the consistency within a set of true matchings to
reduce false alarms. ough it seems that classic copy-move and
splicing detection algorithms [22, 23, 37, 43, 45] relying on visual
features can be easily modied for the new CISD problem, we note
that the two major drawbacks of these existing algorithms are: 1)
handcraed features are less robust against image transformations
(e.g., compression, noise addition and geometric transformations)
and are surely not optimal for the CISD problem; and 2) tuning each
of three stages in GFDF on its own only optimizes performance
disjointly instead of jointly.
In this paper we conceptually follow the GFDF and propose Deep
Matching and Verication Network (DMVN)—a novel deep learning-
based splicing detection and localization method that is 1) unlike
previous GFDF approaches, end-to-end optimized, 2) does not de-
pend on extracting handcraed, unrobust feature representations,
3) uses fully learnable parameters to determine matching or not, and
4) mimics the human validation process to see whether the found
visual evidence is enough to determine a detection. Furthermore,
the proposed method is also distinct from recent deep learning
based forgery detection practices [13, 14, 32, 42] in the sense that
our approach 1) is a full end-to-end deep learning solution instead
of a deep learning module only for feature extraction [13, 14], 2)
performs both localization and detection tasks instead of one or
the other [14, 32, 42], and 3) invents unique deep learning modules
(Deep Dense Matching and Visual Consistency Validator) for perform-
ing visual matching and validation (see Fig.3-(a)). e remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed
DMVN and discusses the training procedure and seings. Experi-
mental results and comparisons against state-of-the-art methods
are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we conclude the paper and
provide directions for future research.
2 DEEP MATCHING VALIDATION NETWORK
2.1 Architecture Overview
As previously mentioned, the CISD problem is formulated as fol-
lows: given a query image Q and a potential donor image P, we
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(a) e proposed DMVN pipeline.
(b) Modules of deep dense matching, mask deconvolution, and visual consistency validator.
Figure 3: Deep matching and validation network for the constrained image splicing detection and localization.
need to determine whether the query image is indeed spliced and
then segment the spliced region in the query image and its corre-
sponding region in the donor image.
As shown in Fig. 3, the overall network is designed such that
block-wise learned representations of the input images are extracted
using a convolutional network network – CNN Feature Extractor
(e.g., AlexNet, ResNet or VGG) and fed into the proposed Deep
Dense Matching module, which performs (as the name implies)
dense matching between the two input images. In order to segment
the splicing masks in the two images, we use an inception-based
Mask Deconvolution module [36]. Further, the predicted masks are
fed into a Visual Consistency Validator module that forces the model
to focus on the segmented areas in both images. Finally, a Siamese-
like module is used to extract splicing-specic dense representations
of the segmented regions in the donor and query images, and it
produces a probability value indicating the likelihood that the donor
image was used to splice the query image. We describe the details
of each of these stages in the following.
2.2 Splicing Localization
Although other CNN models (e.g., ResNet [20]) can be also applied,
we use the rst four convolutional blocks of the VGG16 model [34]
just for the sake of simplicity. Consequently, the two network
inputs Q and P (of shape 3 × 256 × 256) are transformed into deep
tensor representations Qf and Pf (of shape 512× 16× 16.) It is well
known that CNN features like Qf and Pf have already exhibited
certain level of invariance to luminance, scale, and rotation.
e purpose of Deep Dense Matching is to nd possible matching
regions between representations Qf and Pf . As shown in Fig. 3(b),
this is achieved through two steps, namely Deep Feature Correlation
and Correspondence Match Pooling. In Deep Feature Correlation, we
exhaustively compute matching response using cross-correlation
over all possible translations, as shown in Eq. (1)
corr(Pf ,Qf )[x ,y, i, j] = trans(Pf ,x ,y)[:, i, j] · Qf [:, i, j] (1)
where · is the dot product operator, and trans(Zf ,x ,y) circularly
translates Zf w.r.t. (x ,y) pixels, as dened in Eq. (2).
trans(Zf ,x ,y)[:, i, j] = Zf [:,mod(i + x , 16),mod(j + y, 16)] (2)
In Correspondence Match Pooling, we extract out meaningful re-
sponse maps using three types of pooling—average pooling as de-
ned in Eq. (3)
avgPool
(
corr(Pf ,Qf )
)[i,j]=∑15x=0 ∑15y=0 corr(Pf ,Qf )[x ,y,i,j]/256 (3)
max pooling as dened in Eq. (4)
maxPool
(
corr(Pf ,Qf )
)[i, j] = max
x,y
{corr(Pf ,Qf )[x ,y, i, j]} (4)
and argsort pooling as dened in Eq. (5)
argsortPool
(
corr(Pf ,Qf )
)[k] = corr(Pf ,Qf )[kx ,ky , i, j] (5)
where (kx ,ky ) in Eq. (5) is determined by the kth maximum re-
sponse over all translations. Finally, we concatenate one average,
one max, and the top six argsort response maps along the feature
dimension and obtain the dense matching response Qr of shape
8 × 16 × 16 for Q . By interchanging the roles of Pf and Qf in
corr(·, ·), one can therefore obtain Pr .
Fig. 4 visualizes intermediate results of the proposed Deep Dense
Matching layer for the three testing samples from Fig. 2. As one
can see, the proposed deep dense matching module 1) successfully
localizes potential splicing regions, and 2) produces substantially
higher responses to the two positive samples above than the nega-
tive sample (see the red dash line on the right half stats gure in
Fig. 4), implying that the previous CNN Feature Extractor and Deep
Feature Correlation provides meaningful representation with high
discernibility.
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Figure 4: Visualization of selected DMVN layers and the statistics of the 5th maximum responses from correlation matching
pooling layers. Note: 1) all layers are shown by linearly rescaling to [0,1], and visualized w.r.t. the Jet color map, where more
red means higher response; 2) data ranges of pooled matching response maps could be very dierent, but predicted masks
share the same range [0,1]; and 3) rough maximum values of matching responses can be seen in the statistics on the far-right.
In order to produce a splicing mask from the dense response
map, we use a Mask Deconvolution module, as shown in Fig 3(b),
where we gradually deconvolve a response map by a factor of 2
until its size reaches the size of input, i.e., 256 × 256. During each
deconvolution stage, we apply an inception module [36] with a
larger lter size and a smaller number of lters, where the two
types of inception modules can be seen in Fig. 5. is enables us to
obtain splicing masks for both image P and Q , i.e., outputs Pm and
Qm (see examples in the “Predicted Mask” column in Fig. 4.)
Figure 5: e internal architecture of the two types of used
inception modules.
2.3 Splicing Detection
Intuitively, given a query image Q and a potential donor P along
with predicted splicing masks Qm and Pm , one can easily validate
whether two masks match each other by their image contents.
We therefore follow this intuition to design a Visual Consistency
Validation module to fulll the splicing detection task as shown in
Fig. 3(b). Specically, we rst use the Visual Aention module to
zero-out all non-spliced regions in the CNN feature, as shown in
Eq. (6),
visA(Zf ,Z′m )[c, i, j] =
{
Zf [c, i, j], ifZ′m [i, j] > 0.5
0, otherwise (6)
where Z′m is the result of Zm aer classic MaxPooling2D for a size
(16,16). is process is analogous to forcing the network to pay at-
tention only to splicing regions. Furthermore, we follow a Siamese-
like network to compare these two aention features—namely, ex-
tract a new round of features from the two aention features using
the Deep Feature Extractor (see Fig. 6 for detailed architecture), and
then compute the dierence between the two resulting features.
We then concatenate this feature with the feature obtained from the
average mask responses. Finally, we use three stacked dense layers
to infer the probability that p = Proba(P is a donor ofQ), and this
fullls the detection task as shown in Fig. 3(b).
2.4 Training Data and Strategy
To the best of our knowledge, no dataset exists that is large enough
to be directly used for training the proposed DMVN model. To
overcome this limitation, we use the SUN2012 object detection
dataset [40] and the MS COCO dataset [25] to create training sam-
ples according to the unsupervised generation process described
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Figure 6: Internal architecture of the deep feature extractor.
in [44]. Briey, we begin with a random image X with polygon-
based object annotations, randomly select an object in X, then
randomly transform this object and paste it to another randomly
selected image Y to obtain a resulting composite image Z. We could
harvest at most three (two positive and one negative) training
{inputs,outputs} samples for each unsupervised data generation.
For instance, Fig. 2 gives a set of three training samples of this type.
In terms of the parameters controlling the data generation pro-
cess, we equally likely pick an image and an object, random ane
transformation involving a scale change in U(.5, 4), rotation in
U(−10,+10), shi in U(−127,+127), translation U(−127,+127) and
random luminance change inU(−32,+32). is enables us to create
as many samples as needed to train the network end-to-end. Eec-
tively, we create 1.5 M(illion), 0.3M, and 0.3M synthesized samples
for training, validation, and testing, respectively.
e proposed DMVN was implemented using the Keras deep
learning framework with the eano backend, including all custom
correlation and pooling layers. Our model was trained with the
Adadelta optimizer w.r.t. the log loss for both localization and de-
tection branches. Since we design the splicing detection branch
as a Visual Consistency Validator of image contents on predicted
splicing masks, this branch output may not produce meaningful
gradients unless the localization branch produced meaningful splic-
ing masks. us, we rst focus on the localization branch of DMVN
model only. Once this localization branch converges, we freeze
its weights, add on the detection branch, and train the detection
branch until it converges. We nally unfreeze all DMVN weights
and train the entire model end-to-end using the stochastic gradient
optimizer with a learning rate 1e − 5 and momentum of 0.9. In sum-
mary, we achieve 98.52%, 98.67%, and 97.88% prediction accuracy
on the localization branch, and 97.75%, 97.53% and 97.69% predic-
tion accuracy on the detection branch on our synthesized train-
ing, validation, and testing datasets, respectively. Our pretrained
model can be downloaded from hps://gitlab.com/rex-yue-wu/
Deep-Matching-Validation-Network.git.
3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
3.1 Baseline Methods and Test Settings
Since the CISD formulation is completely new, we compare against
baseline algorithms from the state-of-the-art copy-move detection
algorithms. We rely on visual clues, because when we concatenate
the two inputs from a CISD sample into a single combined image,
the resulting image contains copy-move forgery if the CISD sample
is positive. Specically, we choose the classic block matching-based
approach [27], the classic Zernike moments-based block matching
[33] with nearest-neighbor search, the SURF feature-based keypoint
matching [10] and the dense eld matching [11]. All used baselines
are implemented by either a third-party or by the authors of the
corresponding papers.2
With regard to preprocessing, we resize an image to 256 × 256
to t the input size of the proposed DMVN, and thus a 256 × 512
image for those baseline algorithms. With regard to postprocess-
ing, we do not apply any to DMVN, i.e., using the outputs from
DMVN localization and detection branches directly, while keeping
default postprocessing seings of baselines unchanged. Since some
baseline methods only output a splicing mask but not a binary
decision on detection, we follow the tradition in the classic ISD and
copy-move community to determine that a sample is positive if no
pixel is labeled as spliced in a mask. Finally, all baseline methods
are run on Intel Xeon CPU E5-2695@2.40GHz, and the proposed
DMVN is run on Nividia TitanX GPU.
3.2 Dataset
We conduct evaluation experiments on two large datasets: 1) the
paired CASIA dataset, and 2) the NIST-provided Nimble 2017 image
splicing detection dataset. e paired CASIA dataset is a modied
version of the original CASIA TIDEv2.0 dataset [38]3 which con-
tains 7200 authentic color images and 5123 color images tampered
with by realistic manual manipulations (e.g., resize, deform, and
blurring) through Adobe Photoshop CS3. It was originally collected
for both the image copy-move problem and the classic image splic-
ing detection problem. Since the CISD problem requires a pair of
inputs, we select pairs of images from the original CASIA dataset
to create the new paired CASIA dataset. Among the 5123 CASIA
tampered images, we that found 3302 are of the copy-move problem
and 1821 are of the classic ISD task. We therefore generate 3642
positive samples by pairing these 1821 spliced images with their
true donor images, and collect 5000 negative samples by randomly
pairing 7491 color images from the same CASIA-dened content
category. Our paired CASIA dataset can be found at hps://gitlab.
com/rex-yue-wu/Deep-Matching-Validation-Network.git.
With regard to the Nimble 2017 dataset, it is provided by NIST
with 98 positive samples and 529,836 negative samples. is chal-
lenging dataset is particularly designed for the CISD task with
considerations to 1) a very large scale (more than a half million
samples), 2) more realistic and artistic manipulations like image
impainting, seam-carving etc., 3) dicult negative samples with
visually similar foreground and background, and 4) mimicking the
real application scenario where the ratio of negative samples to
positive samples is extremely huge.
It is worth emphasizing that 1) we directly test the DMVN models
trained by our synthetic data without any netuning, and 2) ground
truth splicing masks are not available for both dataset.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
Since both datasets do not provide ground truth splicing masks, we
focus on assessing the splicing detection performance. We follow
2Available at hps://github.com/rahmatnazali/image-copy-move-detection.git, hps:
//www5.cs.fau.de/research/soware/copy-move-forgery-detection/, hp://www.grip.
unina.it/research/83-image-forensics/90-copy-move-forgery.html as the date of April
10, 2017.
3hp://forensics.idealtest.org/casiav2/
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the tradition of the classic ISD and copy-move community, namely,
using precision, recall, and f-score: TP stands for true positive,
i.e., correctly detected as spliced; FN stands for false negative, i.e.,
incorrectly detected as not-spliced; FP stands for false positive, i.e.,
incorrectly detected as spliced; and TN stands for true negative, i.e.,
correctly detected as not-spliced.
precision = TP/(TP + FP) (7)
recall = TP/(TP + FN ) (8)
f-score = 2TP/(2TP + FN + FP) (9)
Furthermore, we also use area under the ROC curve (AUC) to evalu-
ate overall system performance at dierent operation points, where
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is determined
as the function of true positive rate (TPR) in terms of false positive
rate (FPR). TPR and FPR are dened as shown in Eqs. (10) and (11).
e area under an ROC curve then quanties the over-ability of
the system to discriminate between two classes. It is worth noting
that a system which is no beer at identifying true positives than
random guessing has an area of 0.5, and a perfect system without
false positives and false negatives has an area of 1.0; and that AUC
is the only ocial metric used by the Nimble 2017 challenge .
TPR = TP/(TP + FN ) (10)
FPR = FP/(TN + FP) (11)
3.4 Results
e most challenging task in the CISD is to 1) nd spliced regions
under various transformations like translation, rotation, scale, crop,
etc., while dealing with complicated cases like multiple instances
(a donor image contains multiple instances that are similar to a
true spliced region), and multiple spliced regions (a donor image
contributes more than one region); and 2) reduce false alarms on
those visually similar but non-spliced regions.
Table 1: CISD performance comparison on CASIA
Method Precision Recall F-score Time (sec/sample)
[10] 51.64% 82.92% 63.64% 1.85
[27] 99.69% 53.53% 69.66% 6.27×10+2
[33] 96.14% 58.95% 73.09% 8.61
[11] 98.97% 63.34% 77.25% 3.23
DMVN loc. 91.52% 79.18% 84.91% 7.16×10−2
DMVN det 94.15% 79.08% 85.96% 8.29×10−2
(a) ROC on the paired CASIA dataset (b) ROC on the Nimble 2017 dataset
Figure 7: CISD performance comparison using ROC.
Table 1 shows the splicing detection performance of baseline
approaches and the proposed DMVN methods on the paired CASIA
dataset, where DMVN loc. means that we determine whether a
sample (a pair of images) is positive or not by checking whether
any pixel in a predicted splicing mask (from the DMVN localiza-
tion branch) is positive, and DMVN det. means that we directly
use the relation probability (from the DMVN detection branch) to
determine a sample’s label. As one can see, the proposed DMVN
methods outperform peer algorithms by a large margin in terms of
f-score (∼7% higher) on the paired CASIA dataset. Note also that
the proposed DMVN is signicantly faster than baseline approaches
by 20+ times, and that the DMVN detection branch improves our
precision score from 91.52% to 94.15% while only reducing recall
score for 0.1%, thus indicating the eectiveness of the proposed
validation idea which relies on visual aention and Siamese archi-
tecture. Fig. 7 compares ROC and AUC scores for dierent methods,
where DMVN Res. Perc. and DMVN Det. Prob. means that the
threshold used to obtain TPR and FPR is based on the positive pixel
percentage in a resulting mask, and the detection branch’s output
probability, respectively. Again, the proposed DMVN methods are
noticeably beer than others on AUC scores (10%+ on CASIA, and
20%+ on Nimble 2017).
With regard to splicing localization performance, Fig. 8 shows
how the proposed DMVN method conquered this challenge on the
paired CASIA dataset, where Xm indicates a splicing mask binarized
with threshold 0.5, and Xm ∗X indicates an overlaid image by using
the splicing mask as the alpha channel with 40% transparency. To
see this, one shall go to each row in Fig. 8, where the le and
right sides show true positive and negative samples, respectively.
Note that two samples on each row are intentionally picked from a
similar CASIA category and/or a similar object class. As one can see,
the proposed DMVN method not only predicts meaningful splicing
masks on those positive samples, but also correctly suppresses
splicing masks on those negative samples. Fig. 9 shows the manually
annotated ground truth masks along with our predicted masks for
the Nimble 2017 dataset.
3.5 Discussions
Fig. 10 qualitatively compares the splicing localization performance
for all supported baselines. As one can see: 1) classic exhaustive
block matching method [27] is sensitive to transformation, but good
at capturing nearly duplicate regions; 2) block matching algorithm
relying on Zernike moments [33] handles a certain level of trans-
formations, but fails to maintain the completeness of a splicing
region (see those holes in “[33]’s Masks” in row 5 of Fig. 10); 3) a
keypoint-based detector [10] may fail due to no eective keypoints
or noisy keypoints, which can commonly be seen in a homogeneous
region or regions with similar texture, and one has to further con-
vert potential matching points to a mask (see the last row; nding
correspondence does not mean nd a mask); and 4) the proposed
DMVN method does not suer the drawbacks of the previous three
methods and gives satisfactory localization results on homogeneous
and non-homogeneous regions even under severe transformations.
With regard to drawbacks, the proposed DMVN has some dif-
culty detecting splicing objects smaller than 8 × 8; this is due to
the down-sampling in CNN Feature Extractor. As one may notice,
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P Q Pm Qm Pm ∗ P Qm ∗Q P Q Pm Qm
(PID, QID)=(Au arc 00072, Tp D CRN M N arc00073 arc00072 10267) , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au art 30406, Au art 30197) , 
(PID, QID)=(Au ani 00037,Tp D NRN S B ani00036 ani00037 00156) , , , ,  (Au ani 30707,Au ani 30697) , 
(PID, QID)=(Au art 20005,Tp D NRN S N art20006 art20005 01812) , , , , (PID, QID)=(Au sec 30528,Au sec 30506) , , 
(PID, QID)=(Au ani 00089,Tp D NNN S B ani00055 ani00089 11137) , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au ani 20012,Au ani 20009) , , 
(PID, QID)=(Au pla 10126,Tp D NRN S N pla00020 pla10126 12131) , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au pla 30703,Au pla 00045) , 
(PID, QID)=(Au ind 00025,Tp D NRN S N ind00021 ind00025 10398) , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au cha 30609,Au cha 30425) , , 
(PID, QID)=(Au ind 00077,Tp D CND S N ind00078 ind00077 00476) , , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au ind 00084,Au ind 10002) , 
(PID, QID)=(Au cha 00095,Tp D NRN M B sec00020 cha00095 00041) , , , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au sec 30331,Au sec 30019) , , 
(PID, QID)=(Au nat 00097,Tp D NNN M N nat00075 nat00097 11100) , , ,  (PID, QID)=(Au arc 30072,Au arc 30435) , 
(PID, QID)=(Au sec 00085,Tp D CRN M B sec00085 arc00065 11450) ,  (PID, QID)=(Au sec 30331,Au sec 30019) , 
(a) True positive samples (b) True negative samples
Figure 8: DMVN localized splicing masks on the paired CASIA TIDEv2.0 dataset. (PID, QID) indicate the original CASIA
lename of P and Q. Color blocks indicate dierent factors which splicing localization need to be robust against, namely
: translation, : scale, : rotation, : perspective, : crop, : multiple instances, : multiple splicing objects, :similar
foreground, : similar background.
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(a) (PID,QID)= (b) (PID,QID)=
(19e32f2b29a2b345dfd28a8ad857b3fc, (c0cfa4a6a95b3762f9d966e09a0340b9,
797a0b5dd9c47a4b391f4cee60ba9354) 030d521fca99981c442e60e4b2155699)
(c) (PID,QID)= (d) (PID,QID)=
(9883d12156ed82344d65fe19575e1d84, (4bf6a60d74ecd725e3e4b0eedc7d7cc0,
8b570c4bd216f5144774b9c0bc61bbd4) 96492c250780ebababfcebc585ef1db6)
Figure 9: Predicted splicing masks on NC2017 dataset. From
top to bottom, input pair, manually annotated ground truth
masks, predicted splicing masks, and overlaid masks.
our AUC scores on the Nimble 2017 dataset are much lower than
those on the paired CASIA dataset. Besides the fact of extremely
unbalanced positive (98) and negative samples (529836), we no-
tice that the Nimble 2017 dataset contains much more challenging
samples. For example, the proposed DMVN approach produces
false alarms when two images P and Q are from consecutive video
frames, because it mistakenly predicts those similar but genuine
objects in both P and Q as spliced objects.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a new deep neural network based solution
for the image splicing detection and localization problems. We
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Figure 10: Visual comparison of detectedmasks. From top to
bottom, input pair, manually annotated ground truthmasks,
predicted masks of using the proposed DMVN method, pre-
dicted masks of Alg. [27], [33]; the last two rows are [10]’s
matched keypoints and predicted masks.
show that these two problems can be jointly solved using a mul-
titask network in an end-to-end manner, as shown in Fig. 3. In
particular, we invent the Deep Dense Matching layer to nd poten-
tial splicing regions for two given image features, and we design a
Visual Consistency Validator module that determines a detection by
cross-verifying image content on potential splicing regions. Com-
pared to classic solutions, the proposed approach does not rely on
any handcraed features, heuristic rules and parameters, or extra
post-processing, but could fulll both splicing localization and de-
tection. Our experiments on two very large datasets show that this
new approach is much faster and achieves a much higher AUC
score than classic approaches, and that it also provides meaningful
splicing masks that can help a human conduct further forensics
analysis (see Fig. 8). Last but not least, though we train our DMVN
model w.r.t. both localization and detection branches, the proposed
DMVN could be trained w.r.t. only the detection branch while still
aaining the capacity to localize splicing masks due to the feed-
forward nature of DMVN. is fact means that the proposed DMVN
model can be easily netuned to a new CISD dataset with only label
annotations, and that one can save tremendous time and cost for
splicing mask annotation in CISD training data collection.
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REFERENCES
[1] Irene Amerini, Lamberto Ballan, Roberto Caldelli, Alberto Del Bimbo, and
Giuseppe Serra. 2011. A si-based forensic method for copy–move aack de-
tection and transformation recovery. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security 6, 3 (2011), 1099–1110.
[2] Irene Amerini, Rudy Becarelli, Roberto Caldelli, and Andrea Del Mastio. 2014.
Splicing forgeries localization through the use of rst digit features. In Informa-
tion Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2014 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE,
143–148.
[3] Edoardo Ardizzone, Alessandro Bruno, and Giuseppe Mazzola. 2015. Copy–
move forgery detection by matching triangles of keypoints. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security 10, 10 (2015), 2084–2094.
[4] Khurshid Asghar, Zulqar Habib, and Muhammad Hussain. 2016. Copy-move
and splicing image forgery detection and localization techniques: a review.
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences (2016), 1–27.
[5] Mauro Barni, Marco Fontani, and Benedea Tondi. 2012. A universal technique
to hide traces of histogram-based image manipulations. In Proceedings of the on
Multimedia and security. ACM, 97–104.
[6] Tiziano Bianchi and Alessandro Piva. 2012. Image forgery localization via block-
grained analysis of JPEG artifacts. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security 7, 3 (2012), 1003–1017.
[7] Gajanan K Birajdar and Vijay H Mankar. 2013. Digital image forgery detection
using passive techniques: A survey. Digital Investigation 10, 3 (2013), 226–245.
[8] Mo Chen, Jessica Fridrich, Miroslav Goljan, and Jan Luka´s. 2008. Determining
image origin and integrity using sensor noise. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 3, 1 (2008), 74–90.
[9] Yi-Lei Chen and Chiou-Ting Hsu. 2011. Detecting recompression of JPEG images
via periodicity analysis of compression artifacts for tampering detection. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 6, 2 (2011), 396–406.
[10] Vincent Christlein, Christian Riess, Johannes Jordan, Corinna Riess, and Elli
Angelopoulou. 2012. An evaluation of popular copy-move forgery detection
approaches. IEEE Transactions on information forensics and security 7, 6 (2012),
1841–1854.
[11] Davide Cozzolino, Giovanni Poggi, and Luisa Verdoliva. 2015. Ecient dense-
eld copy–move forgery detection. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security 10, 11 (2015), 2284–2297.
[12] Davide Cozzolino, Giovanni Poggi, and Luisa Verdoliva. 2015. Splicebuster: A
new blind image splicing detector. In Information Forensics and Security (WIFS),
2015 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 1–6.
[13] Davide Cozzolino, Giovanni Poggi, and Luisa Verdoliva. 2017. Recasting Residual-
based Local Descriptors as Convolutional Neural Networks: an Application to
Image Forgery Detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04615 (2017).
[14] Davide Cozzolino and Luisa Verdoliva. 2016. Single-image splicing localization
through autoencoder-based anomaly detection. In Information Forensics and
Security (WIFS), 2016 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 1–6.
[15] Alberto A de Oliveira, Pasquale Ferrara, Alessia De Rosa, Alessandro Piva, Mauro
Barni, Siome Goldenstein, Zanoni Dias, and Anderson Rocha. 2016. Multiple
parenting phylogeny relationships in digital images. IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Forensics and Security 11, 2 (2016), 328–343.
[16] Zanoni Dias, Siome Goldenstein, and Anderson Rocha. 2013. Large-scale image
phylogeny: Tracing image ancestral relationships. Ieee Multimedia 20, 3 (2013),
58–70.
[17] Zanoni Dias, Anderson Rocha, and Siome Goldenstein. 2012. Image phylogeny by
minimal spanning trees. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
7, 2 (2012), 774–788.
[18] Zhen Fang, Shuozhong Wang, and Xinpeng Zhang. 2010. Image splicing detec-
tion using color edge inconsistency. In Multimedia Information Networking and
Security (MINES), 2010 International Conference on. IEEE, 923–926.
[19] Hany Farid. 2009. Image forgery detection. IEEE Signal processing magazine 26,
2 (2009), 16–25.
[20] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2015. Deep Residual
Learning for Image Recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.03385 (2015).
[21] Yu-Feng Hsu and Shih-Fu Chang. 2006. Detecting image splicing using geometry
invariants and camera characteristics consistency. IEEE, 549–552.
[22] Ce Li, Qiang Ma, Limei Xiao, Ming Li, and Aihua Zhang. 2017. Image splicing
detection based on Markov features in QDCT domain. Neurocomputing 228
(2017), 29–36.
[23] Haodong Li, Weiqi Luo, Xiaoqing Qiu, and Jiwu Huang. 2017. Image Forgery
Localization via Integrating Tampering Possibility Maps. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security 12, 5 (2017), 1240–1252.
[24] Jian Li, Xiaolong Li, Bin Yang, and Xingming Sun. 2015. Segmentation-based
image copy-move forgery detection scheme. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security 10, 3 (2015), 507–518.
[25] Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva
Ramanan, Piotr Dolla´r, and C Lawrence Zitnick. 2014. Microso coco: Common
objects in context. In European Conference on Computer Vision. Springer, 740–755.
[26] Qingzhong Liu and Zhongxue Chen. 2014. Improved Approaches with Calibrated
Neighboring Joint Density to Steganalysis and Seam-Carved Forgery Detection
in JPEG Images. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. 5, 4, Article 63 (Dec. 2014),
30 pages. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2560365
[27] Weiqi Luo, Jiwu Huang, and Guoping Qiu. 2006. Robust detection of region-
duplication forgery in digital image. In Paern Recognition, 2006. ICPR 2006. 18th
International Conference on, Vol. 4. IEEE, 746–749.
[28] Xunyu Pan, Xing Zhang, and Siwei Lyu. 2011. Exposing image forgery with
blind noise estimation. In Proceedings of the thirteenth ACMmultimedia workshop
on Multimedia and security. ACM, 15–20.
[29] Chi-Man Pun, Xiao-Chen Yuan, and Xiu-Li Bi. 2015. Image forgery detection
using adaptive oversegmentation and feature point matching. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security 10, 8 (2015), 1705–1716.
[30] Zhenhua , Guoping Qiu, and Jiwu Huang. 2009. Detect digital image splicing
with visual cues. In International workshop on information hiding. Springer, 247–
261.
[31] Muhammad Ali reshi and Mohamed Deriche. 2015. A bibliography of pixel-
based blind image forgery detection techniques. Signal Processing: Image Com-
munication 39 (2015), 46–74.
[32] Yuan Rao and Jiangqun Ni. 2016. A deep learning approach to detection of
splicing and copy-move forgeries in images. In Information Forensics and Security
(WIFS), 2016 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 1–6.
[33] Seung-Jin Ryu, Min-Jeong Lee, and Heung-Kyu Lee. 2010. Detection of copy-
rotate-move forgery using zernike moments. In International Workshop on Infor-
mation Hiding. Springer, 51–65.
[34] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman. 2014. Very Deep Convolutional Networks for
Large-Scale Image Recognition. CoRR abs/1409.1556 (2014).
[35] Ashwin Swaminathan, Min Wu, and KJ Ray Liu. 2008. Digital image forensics
via intrinsic ngerprints. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
3, 1 (2008), 101–117.
[36] Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioe, Jon Shlens, and Zbigniew
Wojna. 2016. Rethinking the inception architecture for computer vision. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Paern Recognition.
2818–2826.
[37] Wei Wang, Jing Dong, and Tieniu Tan. 2009. Eective image splicing detection
based on image chroma. In Image Processing (ICIP), 2009 16th IEEE International
Conference on. IEEE, 1257–1260.
[38] Wei Wang, Jing Dong, and Tieniu Tan. 2010. Image tampering detection based
on stationary distribution of Markov chain. In Image Processing (ICIP), 2010 17th
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2101–2104.
[39] Nor Bakiah Abd Warif, Ainuddin Wahid Abdul Wahab, Mohd Yamani Idna Idris,
Roziana Ramli, Rosli Salleh, Shahaboddin Shamshirband, and Kim-Kwang Ray-
mond Choo. 2016. Copy-move forgery detection: Survey, challenges and future
directions. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 75 (2016), 259–278.
[40] Jianxiong Xiao, James Hays, Krista A Ehinger, Aude Oliva, and Antonio Torralba.
2010. Sun database: Large-scale scene recognition from abbey to zoo. In Computer
vision and paern recognition (CVPR), 2010 IEEE conference on. IEEE, 3485–3492.
[41] Markos Zampoglou, Symeon Papadopoulos, Yiannis Kompatsiaris, Ruben
Bouwmeester, and Jochen Spangenberg. 2016. Web and Social Media Image
Forensics for News Professionals. In Tenth International AAAI Conference on Web
and Social Media.
[42] Ying Zhang, Lei Lei Win, Jonathan Goh, and Vrizlynn LL ing. 2016. Image
Region Forgery Detection: A Deep Learning Approach. In Proceedings of the
Singapore Cyber-Security Conference (SG-CRC) 2016: Cyber-Security by Design,
Vol. 14. IOS Press, 1.
[43] Xudong Zhao, Shenghong Li, Shilin Wang, Jianhua Li, and Kongjin Yang. 2012.
Optimal chroma-like channel design for passive color image splicing detection.
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2012, 1 (2012), 240.
[44] Jun-Yan Zhu, Philipp Krahenbuhl, Eli Shechtman, and Alexei A Efros. 2015.
Learning a discriminative model for the perception of realism in composite
images. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision.
3943–3951.
[45] Ye Zhu, Xuanjing Shen, and Haipeng Chen. 2016. Copy-move forgery detection
based on scaled ORB. Multimedia Tools and Applications 75, 6 (2016), 3221–3233.
